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The Continental Shelf-An International Dilemma
HUGH G. MORRIS *
An international scramble is taking place over submerged land which
technically is called the "continental shelf".' World-wide attention was
focused on the continental shelf when the oil industry developed off-
shore drilling techniques during the 1940's. Since then, numerous inter-
national conferences have attempted to define and delimit the shelf,
and to assist in ordering the multitude of claims that have been advanced.
By unilateral declarations, many states have claimed extensive areas,
including continental shelves and superadjacent waters, which tradi-
tionally have been regarded as res communis and res nullius. As Kunz
states, these recent developments "give the impression of a triumphant
upsurge of national sovereignty and threaten to endanger the long-
established principle of the freedom of the high seas."'2 The importance
of the topic is evidenced by the fact that, in conformity with a resolution
of the General Assembly of the United Nations,3 an international con-
ference on the law of the sea was convened at Geneva on February 24,
1958. Canada was represented. The purpose of the conference was "to
examine the Law of the Sea, taking account not only of the legal, but
also the technical, biological, economic and political aspects of the prob-
lem, and to embody the results of its work in one or more international
Convertions."4
This essay will examine general continental shelf problems, with
particular reference to the work of the International Law Commission
which, since 1949, has been attempting to codify and develop the law
of the sea. The continental shelf, of course, represents only one feature
of the law of the sea, and it is unrealistic to ignore related aspects,
such as the territorial sea, contiguous zone, high seas, and fisheries.
For example, the I.L.C. states that the continental shelf begins "outside
the area of the territorial sea". Yet it is not always possible to deter-
mine where the shelf begins because there are disagreements on the
maximum width of the territorial sea.5 Similarly, Article 69 of the
* Mr. Morris, a graduate of Osgoode Hall Law School, 1957, of Edison, Aird &
Berlis, Toronto. During the summer of 1957 the author attended the Hague
Academy of International Law.
1Most of the extensive periodical and treatise literature on the topic is
collected in Josef Kunz, Continental Shelf and International Law: Confusion
and Abuse, (1956), 50 A.J.I.L. 828.
2 Ibid., p. 828.
3 Resolution 1105 (xi), February 21, 1957.
4 Ibid.
5 The three mile limit now Tepresents minimum claims. See John Colombos,
The International Law of -the Sea, 3rd ed. (London, 1954), pp. 66-128. The
Canadian Government is pressing for recognition of a twelve mile breadth for
the territorial sea: House of Commons Debates, Thursday, November 28, 1957,
p. 1653.
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I.L.C. Draft Code on the Law of the Sea protects "the legal status of
the superadjacent waters as High Seas".6 But where do the high seas
commence? While, therefore, the bulk of this essay is confined to dis-
cussing that part of the continental shelf which lies outside territorial
waters, reference necessarily will be made to connected problems.
The Problems Involved
What is the continental shelf? Geologically, the land-mass drops
seaward at an angle or gradient to an average depth of 200 metres,
where (usually) there is a marked increase of slope to the ocean bottom.
The isobath of 200 metres forms, in this simplified picture, an edge.
The sea bottom between the shore and the edge is called the "continental
shelf", and that part of the sea bed between the edge and the sea bottom
is the "continental slope". Canada's continental shelf is extensive. On
the Atlantic coast, it extends, in some places, as far as 250 miles seaward,
varying in depth from 100 to 200 fathoms, before sloping to the sea
bottom. 7 In the Canadian Arctic, the shelf is even more extensive. On
the Pacific coast, the marine zones are characterized "by bold, abrupt
relief, repetitious of the mountainous landscape, and the submerged
shelf is furrowed and deeply ravined."'8 Despite its irregularity, the
Pacific shelf extends seaward to considerable distances-up to 100
miles in some places. The riches of Canada's continental shelf clearly
are not as important as those beneath the dry land mass, yet they may
prove to be significant. In some measure, oil, sedentary fish and, possibly
uranium, are located therein. Further, certain states have participated
in the continental shelf race principally to extend their claims over high
seas fisheries. Hence Canada cannot afford to be disinterested in shelf
problems.
Although decrees on continental shelves were made as long ago as
1916,9 the Truman Proclamation of 194510 sparked the majority of
currently important shelf claims. This Proclamation reserved to
American jurisdiction and control the "natural resources of the
sub-soil and sea bed of the continental shelf", but expressly
negated any suggestion of interference with "the character as
high seas of the waters above the continental shelf". The Ameri-
can position was motivated by the desire to control off-shore
petroleum and other mineral resources.1 It was not directed to juris-
dictional questions affecting the territorial sea or high seas fisheries
6 See (1957), 51 A.J.I.L. 154, at p. 177.
7For charts see (1958), 10 External Affairs 21, at pp. 23-24. For a discussion
of relevant Canadian constitutional law, see E. J. Cosford, The Canadian Con-
stitution and the Tidelands, (1955), Obiter Dicta, 11.
8 The Canada Year Book, Ottawa, 1946.
9 Cf. L. C. Green, The Continental Shelf (1951), 4 Curr. Legal Probs. 54.
1059 Stat. 884 (1946).
1 Political pressures for the Proclamation are discussed in J. W. Bingham,
Juridical Status of the Continental Shelf (1952), 26 So. Calif. Law Rev. 4, at p. 6.
For a review of American state and federal legislation see J. S. Wright, Juris-
diction in the Tidelands (1958), 32 Tulane Law Rev. 175.
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although, obviously, it affected such questions. The progeny of the
Truman Proclamation, however, leave much to be desired. Many states,
ostensibly following a "rule" that the Proclamation, supposedly estab-
lished, have claimed the sea bed, sub-soil, and superadjacent waters,
up to (in some instances) a distance of 200 miles from their coasts.'12
A Mexican proclamation of 1945 claimed not only "each and all of the
natural resources of the continental shelf", but also stated that Mexico
will proceed "to supervise, utilize and control the zones of fishing pro-
tection". In 1948, Iceland claimed the right to establish conservation
zones within the limits of the continental shelf wherein all fisheries
would be subject to Icelandic control. South Korea has claimed extensive
regulatory powers over adjacent seas of 70 miles. The most far-reaching
claims have been made by South and Central American states. In 1946
Argentina proclaimed sovereignty over the Argentinian continental shelf
and continental seas. Panama issued a similar proclamation in the same
year. Chile, a country with practically no shelf, claimed, in, 1947,
sovereignty over "the whole continental shelf of whatever depth"; the
seaward limit for purposes of controlling all natural resources was set
at 200 miles. Ecuador and Peru have claimed jurisdiction over natural
resources of the adjacent seas to a distance of 200 miles from their
coasts.
These and other similar decrees already have led to international
incidents. In 1945, Ecuador seized two American vessels which were
some 14 miles off the Ecuadorian coast. In the course of seizure, one
American seaman was wounded by gunfire, and fines of $49,000 were
levied against the vessels' owners. A more costly adventure occurred in
1954 when five whaling ships, owned by the Greek shipping tycoon
A. S. Onassis, were attacked by Peruvian air and naval units. One ship
was 364 miles off the coast of Peru. Fines of $3,000,000 were collected in
this instance. Protests have been inffective in these situations. Further
incidents probably will occur if states continue their attempts to enforce
unilateral declarations.
It is apparent that the general status of continental shelves is
uncertain. This fact was expressed well by Lord Asquith in the Abu
Dhabi Arbitration when, referring to the I.L.C. drafts, he said:
Neither -the practice of nations nor the pronouncements of learned jurists
give any certain or consistent answer to many, perhaps most, of these
questions. I am of the opinion that there are in this field so many ragged
ends and unfilled blanks, so much that is merely tentative and exploratory,
that in no form can the doctrine be claimed, as yet, to have assumed hitherto
the hard lineaments or the definitive status of an established rule of inter-
national law.' 3
The crucial question is whether unilateral claims have established
new rules of international law. To the extent that such claims lead to
action that is inconsistent with the freedom of the high seas, they have
12 All claims mentioned herein are cited and examined dn detail in M. W.
Mouton, The Continental Shelf, The Hague, 1952.
L3 Petroleum Development Ltd. v. Sheik of Abu Dhabi, (1952). 1 Int. & Comp.
Law Quart. 247.
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no legal basis. The high seas belong to no nation. They can be used
by all states, either for navigation or fishing. This traditional principle
still represents a fundamental rule of customary international law,14
even though American-imposed restrictions for hydrogen bomb tests
recently have raised the question of its efficacy. Theoretically, the erec-
tion of off-shore derricks may infringe the freedom by hindering
navigation, but if shelf claims are valid, there seems to be no reason
why satisfactory adjustments on such secondary problems cannot be
agreed upon. Unilateral claims have not escaped criticism. As early
as 1950, Lauterpacht spoke of "the abuse of the doctrine of the con-
tinental shelf for pretentions to sovereignty over the high seas or
exclusive exploitations of its resources." 15 He wrote of the "inconsistency
of the claims of Chile with international law" and stated that "claims
to sovereignty or exclusive rights over the High Seas are unlawful".
In 1955 he stated that the "claims of Argentina, Chile, Peru, and other
,Latin, American states, have no foundation in international law". The
present writer agrees with Lauterpacht's objections. Many claimants
purposely have confused shelf problems with the rather different ques-
tions of territorial seas, continguous zones, and high sea fisheries, to
facilitate unwarranted extensions of jurisdiction over the latter.
Mouton suggests that, to assess the nature of these claims, attention
must be paid to their contents as well as to their nationalistic charac-
teristics. He classifies them as: (a) those claiming parts of the high
seas; (b) those claiming sovereignty over the continental shelf and,
(c) those claiming minerals only. The South American claims fit into
category (a) and, generally the international community does not
recognize them. However, as Kunz points out, existing rights are
endangered when "such states .. . insist constantly and everywhere
upon their unlawful claims and enforce them by forceful action and
in their own courts ... protests must be repeated. But even repeated
protests may be insufficient in law, may become mere 'paper' protests
unable to bar title by prescriptions". 6 Yet an examination of American
and British protests 7 to South American states indicates that prescrip-
tive titles 8 to high seas areas are unlikely possibilities at the present time.
Mouton also suggests that category (b) claims are not based
on existing international law. He states that even a uniform practice by,
in this case, 15 countries, does not create an international rule. On
balance, this probably is an accurate assessment of the situation. State
.practice has not jelled sufficiently to justify saying that what may be
a trend, especially in Latin American state practice, has become a rule.
14Cf. G. Schwarzenberger, The Fundamental Principles of International Law,
Recueil des Cours, 1955, pp. 358-371.
3-5 H. Lauterpacht, Sovereignty over Submarine Areas (1950), 27 B.Y.I.L. 376.
36 Kunz, op. cit., at p. 852.
' TSee, for instance, U.S. protests to Chile and Peru (1948), Argentina,
.'Ecuador -and El Salvador (1950; British protests to Peru and Chile (1948), to
Costa Rica and El Salvador (1950), to Honduras and Ecuador (1951).
1s Cf. D. H. N. Johnson, Acquisitive Prescription in International Law (1950),
27 B.Y.I.L., 332.
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The proceedings of the International Law Commission evidence a
strong desire by the majority of members to oppose the recognition of
sovereignty over the shelf, as well as to safeguard the freedom of the
superadjacent waters. There may be isolated instances to the contrary,
but the great powers appear to have recognized no generally applicable
customary rules. Finally, there is category (c). The claims of the
United States, the Phillipines and Guatamala, to control and jurisdiction,
fall within this category. Their claims have earned the approval of the
International Law Commission.
What are the legal requirements for acquiring control, juris-
diction or sovereignty over continental shelves? A statement by the
British Government on the positions adopted by various states indicates
that, from a legal point of view, four arguments exist in which to base
claims. They are: (a) the continental shelf is res communis and not
susceptible to occupation by any state. Only exploitation by an inter-
national body is permissable; (b) the continental shelf is res nullius
and capable of occupation when there is effective occupation, i.e., when
there is physical exploitation; (c) the continental shelf is res nuZlius
and capable of occupation simply by means of proclamations; (d) the
continental shelf is not res nullius; title to it vests ipso jure in the coastal
state. Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice speaks for many when he states that:
It now seems settled law that the continental shelf near to any piece of land,
up to a certain depth, is to be regarded as a natural appurtenance or exten-
sion of -the land, the right to which is automatically vested in the coastal
state.19
In reality, the effective development of shelf resources will, in most
instances, depend upon the co-operation of the country which is appur-
tenant to the shelf in question. This point is implicit in Article 68 of
the I.L.C. Draft Code, which states that "the coastal state exercises over
the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and
exploiting its natural resources". The American commentator Bingham,
in supporting this view, attaches importance to the "intense belief of
coastal populations that such coastal economic resources should belong
to them and that unlicensed exploitation by foreigners should not be
permitted".20 The internationalization of continental shelves for exploita-
tion in the general interests of international society is desirable but,
at present, impractical. Like ideas to internationalize "danger spots",
it cannot be realized effectively without a supporting community con-
sciousness which is lacking in contemporary international society. While,
therefore, contiguity may be an acceptable preliminary base for a
somewhat new problem, it is worth recalling that the World Court
disapproved of it as a title to territory.21 Further, it seems clear that
the title to sedentary fisheries has long been based on effective occupa-
'1 G. F. Fitzmaurice, The General Principles of International Law, Recueil
des Cours, 1957, pp. 59-60.20 Bingham, op. cit., at p. 18.
21 The Island of Palmas Case (1928), 2 U.N.R.I.A.A. 829.
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tion2 -- a fact that can and does lead to conflict with states that insist
upon the contiguity principle.
Work of the International Law Commission
The most promising aspect of the problems touched on above is
the work of -the International Law Commission. Under the chairmanship
of Professor Francois of The Hague, an international code has been
drafted covering all features of the law of the sea. For present purposes,
the most important and controversial article is Article 67. In 1951 this
Article read as follows:
As here used, the term "continental shelf" refers to the sea bed and sub-soil
of the submarine areas contiguous to the coast but outside the area of
territorial water, where the depth of the superadjacent waters admits of the
exploitation of the natural resources of the sea bed and sub-soil.2 3
This definition excludes areas in which exploitation technically is
impossible because of the depth of the superadjacent waters. The I.L.C.
previously had considered recommending a fixed shelf limit in terms
of the depth of the superadjacent waters, but in the earlier drafts this
idea was discarded in favour of the "exploitability theory". The main
objection to a fixed limit was that technology might, in the near future,
permit exploitation of the sea bed and the sub-soil at a depth greater
than 200 metres. Moreover, physically continental shelves may be found
to include submarine areas which, though below 200 metres, are exploit-
able through installations erected in neighbouring areas where depths
do not exceed this limit.
At its 5th Session in 1953, the I.L.C. reconsidered the draft. It
* abandoned "exploitability" in, favour of a definite depth test. The 1953
draft article read:
As used in these articles, -the term "continental shelf" refers to the sea bed
and sub-soil of the submarine areas contiguous to the coast but outside the
area of the territorial seas, to a depth of 200 metres. The coastal state exer-
cises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring
and exploiting its natural resources.24
It is significant that the phrase "sovereign rights" is used here
for the first time. The writer will comment on the point below. The
Commission was motivated by the belief that more precise definitions
were needed to prevent uncertainties and disputes, especially between
nations in proximity to each other. The rapporteur stated that:
The Commission considered that -the limit of 200 metres would be sufficient
for all practical purposes at present and probably for a long time to come.
It took the view that the adoption of the fixed limit would have considerable
advantages, in particular with regard to the delimitation of the continental
shelf between adjacent states or states opposite each other.
The latest draft articles were presented in 1956. In its commentary, the
I.L.C. indicated that since 1953 the only basic change related to the
22 See, for example, L. F. Goldie, The Occupation of the Sedentary Fisheries
off the Australian Coasts (1953), 1 Sydney Law Rev. 84.
23 U.N. Doec. A/1858 (1951).
24U.N. Doec. A/2456 (1953).
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continental shelf. To facilitate discussion, certain articles are reproduced
below.
Article 67-For the purpose of these articles, "the term "continental shelf"
is used as referring to the sea bed and sub-soil of the submarine areas
adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth
of 200 metres (approximately 100 fathoms), or, beyond that limit, to where
the depth of the superadjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the
natural resources of the said areas.
Article 68-The coastal state exercises over the continental shelf sovereign
rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting its natural resources.
Article 69-The rights of the coastal state over the continental shelf do not
affect the legal status of the superadjacent waters as high seas, or that of
the air space above those waters.
Article 70--Subject to its right to take reasonable measures for the explora-
tion of the continental shelf and the exploitation of its natural resources,
the coastal state may not impede the laying or maintenance of submarine
cables on the continental shelf.
Article 71-Subsection (1)-The exploration of the continental shelf and the
exploitation of its natural resources must not result in any unjustifiable
interference with navigation, fishing or the conservation of -the living re-
sources of the sea.
Obviously, many claims do not meet these requirements. It will be noted
that, in Article 67, the I.L.C. abandoned the fixed depth criterion in
favour of a combined exploitability and fixed depth test. Commission
commentary indicates that this decision was not reached without con-
siderable disagreement. Nevertheless, the uncertainties that were inher-
ent in earlier drafts emerge again with the re-introduction of the
"exploitability concept". On the other hand, some members felt that
this addition had the advantage of discouraging beliefs that at the
200 metres depth there are fixed zones where rights other than those
stated in Article 68 can be exercised. The writer agrees with the
observation of the Canadian Government:
This additional provision [exploitability] reintroduces the uncertainty which
led the commission to favour a fixed limit in terms of the depth of super-
adjacent waters for determining the legal boundary of the shelf. It is
considered -that the forseeable possibilities of exploitation at greater depth
than 200 metres might be provided for without sacrificing the element of
certainty concerning the extent of states' rights to exploit the resources
of the sea bed. It is understood that in 90% of instances, excluding polar
regions, the edge of the continental shelf is well defined geographically.
It is suggested, therefore, that in these cases the boundary of the shelf should
be its actual edge. Where, however, the edge of the shelf is ill-defined or
where there is no shelf in a geographical sense, the boundary might be set
at such a depth as might satisfy forseeable practical prospects of exploitation.5
Norway also criticized the exploitability test on the ground that, owing
to scientific progress, the effect of the addition would be to parcel out
,entire ocean areas among coastal states. However, in the words of
the Commission:
It is not its intention ... to allow the coastal states to establish a monopoly
of exploitation of the sea bed and sub-soil of the ocean throughout their
extent. At the present time, the fear of such a monopoly does not appear to
be justified. If that situation did materialize, as a result of technical develop-
ments, it would no doubt be possible to take whatever action seemed
opportune to consider how its unexpected consequences should be remedied. 26
25 House of Commons Debates, op. cit., at p. 1654.
26 U.N. Doc. A/13/19. December 3, 1957.
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This appears to be just another way of saying that, because states
cannot -agree on either method of delimitation, resort has been had to
the dual test. The writer is critical of the double test. The 200 metre
criterion appears to be 'preferable because of the certainty that it affords.
Its use would reduce potential conflicts to a minimum and, if a state
is able to exploit adjacent coastal areas at a depth greater than 200
metres, fisheries and other important rights can be protected by agree-
ment between interested parties.
Turning now to the phrase "sovereign rights" in Article 68, it
should be noted that Canada has not commented on the point, nor has
she referred to the problem of defining "natural resources". [In
earlier I.L.C. drafts, "natural resources" were referred to as
"mineral resources".] The desirability of including the phrase
"sovereign rights" is questionable. It has facilitated some out-
rageous South American claims, which confuse the term "sovereign
rights" with the more general and extensive word "sovereignty".
Had the Commission more clearly defined rights of the sea bed
and sub-soil, some of the extravagant claims to fishing rights in
superadjacent waters might never have arisen. To illustrate the con-
fusion that has ariser through the use of the phrase "sovereign rights",
comments on Article 68 may be noted. Norway stated:
The Norwegian Government -has some difficulty for its part in seeing the
necessity of granting -the coastal state "sovereign rights" for the purpose
of exploiting the natural resources of the continental shelf. Whether and
to what extent it will be necessary or reasonable to grant special privileges
of the proposed kind to the coastal state seems to be a question which is
intimately dependent on the solution which is given to the problem of the
breadth of the territorial sea. If such rights are to 'be granted to the coastal
state it would seem to be an indispensible condition that the zone within
which they will be exercised should be far more clearly defined than in the
present wording of Article 67. In view of the uncertainty of geological
criteria, and in view of the fact that the reasons advanced in favour of these
special privileges for the coastal state apply only in the neighbourhood
of its coast, it might seem preferable to define the zone by a fixed maximum
distance from the coast. The problem of reconciling normal geological inter-
pretations given by the Commission in its commentary, with the text of
the Article would then not arise.27
By contrast, the Cuban Government stated that it had noted,
with special satisfaction the Commission's recognition of the fact
that the coastal state enjoys sovereign rights solely for -the purpose of
exploring and exploiting the natural -resources of those areas and that
consequently, those -rights do not affect the legal status of the superadjacent
waters as High Seas or -that of the air space above those waters. Certain
states have claimed that those rights extend to the so-called "Epicontinental
waters" but the great majority of states has shown itself opposed to that
claim and considers that such waters are part of the 'high seas and are subject
to the legal -rules applicable thereto.
On the same point, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice says:
Note that this provision does not speak of "sovereignty" as such, but of
"sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting the natural
resources" of the shelf. It is made clear in the Commission's accompanying
commentary, that the term "sovereignty" was deliberately avoided with the
27 U.N. Doc. A/13/5. November 7, 1957. Norway's position is influenced by
the fact that her continental shelf is uniquely irregular.
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object of "safeguarding the principle of the full freedom of the super-
adjacent seas and the air space above it".28
It will be remembered that nowhere in the Truman Proclamatioi is the
word "sovereignty" used. Indeed, the United States has protested to states
that have purported to claim sovereignty. One wonders, however, if these
debates really are meaningful. Surely "jurisdiction and control" is the
equivalent of limited sovereignty. On the other hand, certain South
American states which in fact have no continental shelf appear to have
confused the use of the terms and their objects. Thus, in December
1957, some states seriously questioned why countries without a shelf
should not be given sovereign rights over adjoining seas to a distance
of 200 miles. This represents a complete confusion of separate topics.
It could lead, moreover, to gross inequalities. Article 69 states that
nations which have no shelves have no rights over the superadjacent
waters. States concerned would be wise to accept this guide, and con-
centrate on working out mutually beneficial agreements on such matters
as the contiguous zone, territorial sea and high seas fisheries.
There are many opinions on what the term "natural resources"
includes. Some countries have claimed everything in the sea. Mouton,
in his 1954 Hague lectures, 2 divides natural shelf resources into three
categories, two of which include such fish as cod, haddock, halibut and
oysters--"deep sea fish" and "bottom fish"; the third category includes
minerals. The use of the phrase "natural resources" has contributed to
prevailing uncertainties. The I.L.C. comments on Article 68 indicate
that:
The products of sedentary fisheries in particular to the extent that they
vere natural resources permanently attached to the bed of the sea, should
not be left outside the scope of the regime adopted, and that this aim could
be achieved by using the term "natural resources". 30
The Commission further states that "it is clearly understood that the
rights in question do not cover so-called 'bottom fish', and other fish,
which although living in the sea occasionally have their habitat at the
bottom of the sea, or are bred there". In the writer's opinion, the
I.L.C. could have assured greater certainty if it had restricted the
scope of Article 68 to "mineral resources" and, perhaps, specifically
identified such sedentary fish as are generally agreed to be included
in the regime of the continental shelf.
Article 69 safeguards freedom of the seas against the coastal
state's exercise of rights over the continental shelf. It provides that
shelf rights of the coastal state do not affect the legal status of the
superadjacent waters as high seas or the air space above the super-
adjacent waters. In the words of the I.L.C.:
The Articles on the continental shelf are intended as laying down the regime
of the continental shelf only as subject to, and within the orbit of, the para-
mount principle of the freedom of the seas and of the air space above them.
No modification of or exceptions to that principle are admissable unless
expressly provided for in the various articles.31
28Fitzmaurice, op. cit., pp. 50-51.29 Hague Academy of International Law, Recueil des Cours,, 1954.30 U.N. Doc. A/3159.
31 Ibid.
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Conclusion
Despite their vagueness, the draft articles, and commentaries, focus
attention on the difficulties involved, articulate some of the reasons for
conflicting claims, and provide basic materials for possible conventional
solutions. That the drafts can provide the basis for agreements is
evidenced by the fact that some nations have accepted them already.
There must be "give and take" before wide-spread agreements are
achieved. With law running second to power in current international
politics, there probably will be more "taking" than "giving" in the
immediate future. Hence, Canada must beware that other nations do
not acquire rights over super-adjacent waters that will impair our
historic fishing interests. The extensiveness of Canada's continental
shelf make the subject one of peculiar importance to her, and it is not
too much to hope that Canadian lawyers will contribute meaningfully
to relevant international debates.
